The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday is set to consider, among other things, if restitution ordered under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is a form of criminal punishment. (AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite, File)
The court will also issue orders Tuesday.
Here, Law360 breaks down the week's oral arguments.
Postconviction Relief
On Tuesday, the Supreme Court will consider whether limitations on the number of habeas corpus applications state prisoners can file also restrict how many times federal inmates can attempt to challenge the legality of their sentences.
Florida defendant Michael Bowe, who pled guilty and was sentenced to a total of 24 years in prison for attempted armed robbery of an armored bank vehicle in 2008, has asked the justices to review the Eleventh Circuit's determination that, for the third time, he is not entitled to challenge part of his sentence. Bowe has repeatedly sought approval to file a motion to vacate his 10-year sentence for brandishing a firearm during the attempted robbery as the Supreme Court has refined what qualifies as a crime of violence that triggers the additional gun charge.
After the high court held in 2022 that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery affecting interstate or foreign commerce is not a violent crime for purposes of the gun charge, Bowe sought authorization to file a successive motion to vacate his sentence. But an Eleventh Circuit panel dismissed his request, given that he had already tried twice to file similar motions following other changes in law. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, federal courts are required to dismiss federal inmates' second or successive attempts to file motions to vacate, the panel ruled.
Bowe argues the appellate court misread the statute, and that AEDPA's bar on repetitive filings applies only to state prisoners' habeas corpus applications. The section in question, 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(1), explicitly mentions habeas applications but doesn't reference motions to vacate, so Congress clearly meant the two types of filings to be treated differently, he said. Lawmakers also established different qualifications for allowing additional filings depending on the type, Bowe said.
Although courts are instructed to follow the same procedural steps under Section 2244(b)(3) to review habeas applications and motions to vacate, Bowe said it doesn't make sense that lawmakers would pick and choose which of the other two Section 2244(b) subsections apply to federal inmates.
The United States agrees with Bowe's argument about AEDPA's repetitive filing bar, but contends that a Section 2244(b)(3) subsection that prohibits appeals of filing authorization decisions strips the Supreme Court of authority to hear this case. If the four other subsections of Section 2244(b)(3) apply equally to state and federal inmates, the final subsection, Section 2244(b)(3)(E), must as well, the government said. And correcting the Eleventh Circuit's procedural error won't affect the ultimate outcome of Bowe's appeal, it said.
Meanwhile, Bowe contends that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear his case because the section that authorizes federal inmates to file motions to vacate their sentences doesn't include a similar jurisdictional rule. Alternatively, the appellate court's dismissal of his request to file a new motion is reviewable because Section 2244(b)(3)(E) only governs grants or denials, he said.
Kirkland & Ellis LLP partner Kasdin M. Mitchell, whom the Supreme Court appointed to defend the Eleventh Circuit's ruling, counters that all three subsections of Section 2244(b) apply to federal and state inmates equally. Congress made the policy choice of routing both types of postconviction relief through the procedures in that section, she said, and there is no carveout language to support the arguments otherwise. When lawmakers did want to treat federal and state prisoners differently, it included trumping language in the respective statutes, including what qualifies an additional filing as a new and allowable one for each type of relief, Mitchell argued.
Andrew L. Adler, of the Federal Public Defender's Office for the Southern District of Florida, will argue for Bowe, Anthony A. Yang, of the U.S. Solicitor General's Office, will argue for the federal government, and Kirkland's Kasdin M. Mitchell will argue in defense of the judgment below.
The case is Bowe v. United States, case number 24-5438.
Restitution Awards
Also Tuesday, the justices will debate if restitution ordered under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is a form of criminal punishment.
Missouri resident Holsey Ellingburg Jr., who served roughly 26 years in prison for a 1995 bank robbery, has asked the high court to reverse an Eighth Circuit ruling that found restitution issued under the 1996 act is a civil penalty that's not subject to constitutional bars on retroactive punishments. Ellingburg is attempting to duck liability for a restitution award that has ballooned to more than $13,000 with interest.
A three-judge panel rejected Ellingburg's argument that MVRA restitution was barred in his case by the Constitution's ex post facto clause, which prohibits retroactive applications of laws that increase criminal punishments. The MVRA, which took effect in April 1996, amended the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 by, among other things, increasing the limit on restitution awards and extending the length of time a criminal defendant would be liable for paying the penalty from 20 years after a judgment was entered to a period of either 20 years after a judgment or 20 years after the end of imprisonment, whichever is later.
Ellingburg argues the MVRA is a "paradigmatic" form of criminal punishment that was improperly applied to his case, even though he was sentenced after its enactment. The act instructs courts to impose restitution as an additional punishment at a criminal defendant's sentencing, and subjects the award amount to the same investigative and evidentiary procedures used for determining the right length of a defendant's imprisonment sentence, he said. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that restitution can be used for punitive purposes, and the court should do so in this case and remand for further proceedings, Ellingburg said.
The United States agrees that MVRA restitution is a criminal punishment, but contends the act was properly applied in Ellingburg's case. Along with the procedural arguments, the government claims there was a national consensus among appellate courts that the MVRA's predecessor, the VWPA, imposed restitution as a criminal penalty. Since Congress didn't explicitly reject that understanding of the law, the MVRA can be read to impose criminal penalties as well, the government argued. The Supreme Court should vacate the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the MVRA but make clear that its bottom-line judgment finding the act MVRA was properly applied to Ellingburg's case was correct.
However, John Bash, a Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP partner appointed by the Supreme Court to defend the Eighth Circuit's ruling, contends the justices should dismiss Ellingburg's appeal as improvidently granted, arguing the challenged restitution award wasn't imposed under the MVRA. Bash claims the sentencing court issued the award under the old VWPA scheme since the U.S. Solicitor General's Office had advised U.S. attorneys against applying the new act to crimes committed before its enactment.
If the Supreme Court disagrees with that reading of the case's record, Bash contends restitution under the MVRA is a civil penalty because the act ensures that any award issued would be designed to fully compensate the victims of a crime, and it bars courts from considering other penological facts when ordering restitution. Both civil and criminal sanctions can be labeled penalties, he said, and when Congress intends penalties to be treated as criminal punishment, it explicitly labels them as "criminal penalties," Bash adds.
Williams & Connolly LLP partner Amy M. Saharia will argue for Ellingburg, Ashley Robertson, of the U.S. Solicitor General's Office, will argue for the federal government, and Quinn Emanuel's Bash will argue in defense of the judgment below.
The case is Ellingburg v. United States, case number 24-482.
Voting Rights Act
On Wednesday, the Supreme Court will consider whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act violates the 14th and 15th amendments.
The justices will hear reargument in an appeal of a Western District of Louisiana judicial panel's finding that Louisiana's attempt to correct Voting Rights Act violations by adding a second majority-Black voting district overemphasizes race and runs afoul of the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. When the court first heard arguments in the dispute in March, Louisiana and a group of Black voters led by Press Robinson, had asked the Supreme Court to overturn the judicial panel's ruling on those narrow grounds.
But now, after the high court punted on that question and requested additional briefing on a much broader issue, alliances have shifted once again in the convoluted battle that threatens to invalidate the last remaining provision of the seminal Voting Rights Act.
Louisiana now argues that compliance with Section 2 often compels states to enact unconstitutional racial gerrymanders to address voter dilution claims. That understanding of the statute doesn't comply with the court's belief that the Constitution is colorblind or the justices' recent ruling in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard College, which outlawed the use of affirmative action in college admissions.
A group of self-described non-Black voters, led by Phillip Callais, agree, claiming it is time to end the use of Section 2. The VRA may well have been enacted to address real harms in the 1960s, but the voters claim its usefulness has expired. Now, they insist, instead of promoting equality, Section 2 only forces lawmakers to adopt racially segregated maps.
Meanwhile, the group of Black voters who challenged Louisiana's original congressional map contend Section 2's built-in limitations, including a requirement that any voter dilution claims be based on current-day evidence of discrimination, means the provision will fade into the background in its own time, and that the Supreme Court doesn't need to artificially speed up that process. A ruling finding the provision unconstitutional would require the justices to second-guess Congress' work and constitute judicial overreach, the Black voters said.
The United States will also weigh in, arguing in favor of a middle-of-the-road solution. The government contends the Supreme Court should modify the test to determine when a minority group's voting power is being diluted, which was first established in the court's 1986 decision in Thornburg v. Gingles. If the justices raise the bar for proving voter dilution claims, they could prevent many errors common in VRA litigation without finding the act entirely unconstitutional, the government said. Under the revised test, a Section 2 plaintiff would have to prove that they could draw a superior district while still meeting the state's race-neutral redistricting principles, among other things, the U.S. said.
Janai Nelson, NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund Inc. president, will argue for the Black voters, Graves Garrett Greim LLC partner Edward D. Greim will argue for the non-Black voters, Louisiana Solicitor General J. Benjamin Aguiñaga will argue for the state, and Hashim M. Mooppan, of the U.S. Solicitor General's Office, will argue for the federal government.
The consolidated cases are Louisiana v. Callais et al., case number 24-109, and Robinson et al. v. Callais et al., case number 24-110.
Warrantless Home Entries
Also Wednesday, the justices will mull whether law enforcement can enter a home without a warrant if they lack probable cause that an emergency is occurring inside.
Montana defendant William Trevor Case has petitioned the high court to reverse a Montana Supreme Court ruling that found officers with the Anaconda-Deer Lodge County Police Department lawfully entered his home in 2021 based on their belief that he was going to kill himself. Case's ex-girlfriend had called the police to his home after a distressing phone call in which Case allegedly said he was going to shoot himself.
The state supreme court ruled the police officers didn't violate the Fourth Amendment when they entered Case's home because they had "objectively reasonable basis" to believe he had either already hurt himself or was in danger of hurting himself. The officers didn't need probable cause or a warrant to enter since the situation was "totally divorced" from a criminal investigation, the Montana Supreme Court said.
But Case argues the law is clear that more than an "objectively reasonable basis" is needed. Such a low standard would erode the traditional liberty interest associated with a home, he said, and would allow law enforcement to enter based on even the most ambiguous signs that something may be wrong, including children yelling. Requiring officers to prove probable cause that an emergency is occurring would protect individuals while still allowing law enforcement to act quickly in most situations, Case said.
Montana counters that Case's preferred reading of the Fourth Amendment contradicts its plain text, which clearly doesn't require a showing of probable cause unless a warrant is involved. While warrantless entries into homes are presumptively unreasonable, the state that presumption can be easily overcome by showing that an emergency was likely occurring. The officers in this case did all that was required of them by corroborating Case's ex-girlfriend's report with on-the-ground observations, which included looking through a window to see an empty gun holder and a notepad with writing on it that officers believe could've been a suicide note.
The United States, which will argue in favor of Montana, agreed that warrantless entries in emergency situations don't require a showing of probable cause. The government's interests are at their "zenith" in times of emergencies while individuals have little interest in preventing potentially lifesaving aid, the government said. Those factors, as well as the fact that emergency entries into homes are typically less intrusive than searches related to criminal investigations, show the two situations require different levels of reasonableness.
Fred A. Rowley Jr., a Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati partner, will argue for Case, Montana Solicitor General Christian B. Corrigan will argue for the state, and Zoe A. Jacoby, of the U.S. Solicitor General's Office, will argue for the federal government in favor of Montana.
The case is Case v. Montana, case number 24-624.
--Editing by Jay Jackson Jr.