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Monmouth Real Estate Investment Corporation
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Utility | Filed: June 14, 2022 | Entered: June 14, 2022 Wallace v. Monmouth Real Estate Investment Corporation et al
Securities/Commodities | New York Eastern
Incorrect Case-Document Information
Incorrect Case Information: The Order to Show Cause filed on 6/14/2022 was entered in the wrong case and has been removed. Please disregard. (Lee, Tiffeny)
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Order | Filed: October 13, 2021 | Entered: June 14, 2022 Wallace v. Monmouth Real Estate Investment Corporation et al
Securities/Commodities | New York Eastern
~Util - Terminate Civil Case
Civil Case Terminated. (Lee, Tiffeny)
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Order | Filed: June 10, 2022 | Entered: June 10, 2022 Wallace v. Monmouth Real Estate Investment Corporation et al
Securities/Commodities | New York Eastern
Order to Show Cause
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE: Plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendants violated Sections 14(e), 14(d), and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by omitting material information from a solicitation statement accompanying a merger tender offer. See Compl. ¶&para 25-60 (Dkt. #1). As a result of these omissions, plaintiff claims he is "threatened with irreparable harm." Id. &para 53. Plaintiff also claims that disclosure of this information would "alter the total mix of information available to the Companys shareholders." Id. ¶&para 33, 35, 47. However, the complaint does not appear to identify any concrete injury that plaintiff actually suffered.
In 2021, the Supreme Court decided TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, and established that, even where a defendant's conduct is prohibited by statute, a plaintiff may not have standing to sue in federal court if the plaintiff has not suffered an injury in fact. 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021) ("[A]n important difference exists between (i) a plaintiff's statutory cause of action to sue a defendant over the defendant's violation of federal law, and (ii) a plaintiff's suffering concrete harm because of the defendant's violation of federal law."). To have standing, a plaintiff must allege a harm that "has a 'close relationship' to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts -- such as physical harm, monetary harm, or various intangible harms including (as relevant here) reputational harm." Id. at 2200 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 340-341, (2016)). Since TransUnion, courts in this circuit applying this principle have found that when plaintiffs fail to allege injuries in fact, they lack standing to sue in federal court. Examples of allegations that fail to meet the injury-in-fact standard include allegations that errors in notices produced confusion or resulted in wasted time and effort. See e.g., Cavazzini v. MRS Assocs., 2021 WL 5770273, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2021) ("Multiple courts have found [mere] alleged confusion to be insufficient for standing in the FDCPA context." (collecting cases)); see ibid. ("A plaintiff who has failed to assert a concrete injury supporting any of his other claims cannot clear the standing threshold by claiming wasted time; to allow otherwise would enable litigants to manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Zevon v. Am. Express Co., No. 20-CV-4938 (GHW), 2021 WL 4330578, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2021) (failure to include information required by the Truth in Lending Act insufficient to establish standing); Sevilla v. House of Salads One LLC, No. 20-CV-6072 (PKC) (CLP), 2022 WL 954740, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2022) (dismissing New York Labor Law claim for failure to provide statutorily required notices because plaintiff does not allege that failure to provide required notices led to concrete harm).
Moreover, while a future injury may supply standing, that injury must be "certainly impending." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quotations omitted). "[A]llegations of possible future injury are not sufficient." Ibid. (quotations omitted). In other words, the mere possibility that a deprivation of material information could result in monetary harm is also insufficient to supply standing. See, e.g., Bohnak v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc., No. 21-CV-6096 (AKH), 2022 WL 158537, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2022) (possibility of sale of stolen information not enough to establish standing after data breach).
Here, the complaint does not appear to allege any injury that meets the injury-in-fact standard. Plaintiff states that he has not received statutorily required information, but he has not identified any concrete harm resulting from the lack of this information, and he has not alleged more than the mere possibility that the lack of information could result in possible future injury. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. Accordingly, by June 24, 2022, plaintiff is directed to file a letter showing cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Ordered by Judge Rachel P. Kovner on 6/10/2022. (Andrews, Stephen)
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