Order | Filed: October 02, 2026
| Entered: October 02, 2026
Prendergast v. Planet Fitness, Inc. et al
Civil Rights: Other | Florida Southern
Order on Motion to Vacate Order on Motion to Reopen Case
PAPERLESS ORDER denying as moot 22 Plaintiff's Objection to and Motion to Vacate Order Dismissing Case [ECF No. 19], and Motion to Reopen Case with Incorporated Memorandum of Law ("Motion").
Plaintiff's Motion first seeks relief from the Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice, [ECF No. 19], on the grounds that "it is a final dispositive order entered by a Magistrate Judge without the consent required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1)[.]" Mot. at 1. Magistrate Judge Lett issued the Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice, [ECF No. 19], on September 25, 2026. But as noted in his Motion, Plaintiff filed his Notice of Non-Consent to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction ("Notice"), [ECF No. 9], on December 9, 2025. Plaintiff asks in the alternative that the Court "treat ECF No. 19 as a report and recommendation and conduct de novo review[.]" Id. at 2.
Liberally construed, the Court reviews Plaintiff's Motion under Rule 60(b)(4). "Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order based on a finding that the judgment is void." Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001). A judgment is void "if the rendering court was powerless to enter it." Id. However, relief under Rule 60(b)(4) is not warranted here. This Court has acknowledged that Plaintiff filed the Notice prior to the Magistrate Judge's Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice. See Order Requiring Second Amended Complaint, [ECF No. 21]. Accordingly, the Court "conducted its own independent analysis of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and agree[d] with the Order of Dismissal's conclusions that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading and contains statutorily barred claims." Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiff was then given leave to file a second amended complaint and has done so. See [ECF No. 23]. Because the relief sought by Plaintiff has already been granted, Plaintiff's Motion is hereby DENIED as moot. See Mot. at 2 (requesting that the District Court conduct all further proceedings and "accept for filing the Second Amended Complaint").
Further, Plaintiff requests that the Court "direct the United States Marshals Service to serve process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)...." Mot. at 2. But when a pro se Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the Court has authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) to screen the case for a "fail[ure] to state a claim on which relief may be granted." See also Mehmood v. Guerra, 783 F. App'x 938, 940 (11th Cir. 2019) ("Under § 1915(e), district courts have the power to screen complaints filed by all IFP litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike."). Therefore, the Court will only direct service once it has screened Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint under § 1915(e) to ensure it complies with applicable pleading standards. See Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[Section 1915(e)(2)] allows a district court to sua sponte dismiss a claim of... a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis... before service of process." (cleaned up)). Should the Court determine that Plaintiff's claim(s) may proceed to service, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshals Service to effectuate service of process by separate Order.
Lastly, Plaintiff seeks "[t]o reopen the case[.]" Mot. at 2. However, an administrative closure is purely a matter of court administration that in no way impacts the Court's ability to review and adjudicate Plaintiff's claims. As such, Plaintiff's request to administratively reopen this case is DENIED. This case shall remain administratively CLOSED pending this Court's review of the Second Amended Complaint, [ECF No. 23].
Signed by Judge Rodolfo A. Ruiz, II on 10/2/2026. (smm)