District Judge Margaret R. Guzman: ELECTRONIC ORDER:
Defendants’ Proposed Instruction No. 17 states that Plaintiff must prove, as the third of three elements, that “[s]he was terminated for failing to comply with the employment requirement.”
That formulation can be read to require Plaintiff to establish but-for causation and, to that extent, does not accurately state the applicable standard.
A claim of religious discrimination or failure to accommodate under Title VII is a disparate-treatment claim governed by the motivating-factor standard codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 772–73 (2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)) (“Title VII relaxes [the but-for causation] standard... to prohibit even making a protected characteristic a ‘motivating factor’ in an employment decision.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff need not prove that her religious beliefs were the but-for cause of her termination. Rather, she must prove that her religious belief was a motivating factor in Defendants’ decision.
The First Circuit recently confirmed this understanding in another COVID-19 vaccination religious-discrimination case. See Deangelis v. Hasbro, Inc., 165 F.4th 646, 658 (1st Cir. 2026) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)) (observing that “section 2000e-2 requires the employee’s religious observance, belief, or practice to have been ‘a ‘motivating factor’ in an employment decision[]’ made by the employer.”).
This standard is distinct from, and should not be conflated with, the causation standard applicable to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim (Count V). Retaliation claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) are governed by but-for causation. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360, 362 (2013).
Because Plaintiff’s discrimination claim is governed by a motivating-factor standard, the instruction must also address the same-decision defense set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
Under that provision, if Plaintiff proves that her religious belief was a motivating factor in Defendants’ decision, Defendants may limit the available remedies by proving that they would have made the same decision regardless of Plaintiff’s religious belief. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); Rapold v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609–10 (7th Cir. 2013). If Defendants establish that defense, Plaintiff prevails on liability but may not recover the remedies identified in § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
The omission of language addressing that same-decision defense—not the use of a motivating-factor standard itself—recently required a new trial in a closely analogous case. See McCormick v. Chicago Transit Auth., No. 23 C 1998, 2025 WL 3706019, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2025) (ordering a new trial where the jury was correctly instructed that religion need only be “a motivating factor” in a Title VII discrimination claim, but the instruction omitted the accompanying burden-shift and remedies-limitation language).
The Court requires supplemental information, but provides a few options for responding below. Overall, the parties are directed to file a proposed jury instruction addressing the same-decision defense and the resulting limitations on remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The Court will, on its own, address the changes needed to reflect the appropriate “motivating factor” standard for the Defendants’ Proposed Instruction #17 (hereinafter, “Required Elements of Plaintiff’s Discrimination Claim”). Should the parties find that, in adding an instruction on the same-decision defense, other aspects of their proposed jury instructions must be amended, the parties shall file amended jury instructions that include a redlined version reflecting all changes from their previously filed proposed jury instructions.
If the parties contend that the governing law requires a different instruction or the Court is otherwise mistaken, they may file a focused memorandum of opposition.
This Order does not require any change to Defendants’ Proposed Instruction No. 26 (Causation for Retaliation Claim).
Therefore, the parties are ORDERED to file one of the following options:
1. Option 1: a new single instruction on the same-decision defense, with no other changes to the other jury instructions;2. Option 2: an amended version of their proposed jury instructions with a redline markup, that includes a new instruction on the same-decision defense and incorporates any changes that must be made to the other... (truncated)