Order | Filed: September 11, 2026
| Entered: September 11, 2026
SAMPSON v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETIREMENT BOARD
Civil Rights: Jobs | District Of Columbia
.Order ~Util - Set/Reset Hearings
MINUTE ORDER: Before the Court is the Parties' 38 Conferral Statement. In it, they report that they did not reach an agreement on a discovery schedule. ECF No. 38 at 1. Plaintiff seeks to depose Joseph Bress; she says that "discovery should close on either September 30, 2026 or two days after" she completes the deposition. Id. at 12. Defendant says that "discovery is closed." Id. at 3. The D.C. Circuit has "repeatedly recognized" that "district courts have broad discretion over the structure, timing, and scope of discovery." Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 964 F.3d 1203, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) provides that a scheduling order can be modified "for good cause and with the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). "What constitutes good cause sufficient to justify the modification of a scheduling order necessarily varies with the circumstances of each case." Wright & Miller, 6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1522.2 (3d ed.). Courts consider--among other things--"whether trial is imminent"; "whether the non-moving party would be prejudiced"; "the foreseeability of the need for additional discovery in light of the time allotted by the district court"; "whether the moving party was diligent in obtaining discovery within the guidelines established by the court"; and "the likelihood that the discovery will lead to relevant evidence." Watt v. All Clear Bus. Sols., LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326 (D.D.C. 2012) (cleaned up). But the most important consideration is whether a party "was diligent in conducting discovery within the schedule set by the district court." Hussain v. Nicholson, 435 F.3d 359, 367 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Rogers, J., concurring). Although it is a close call, these factors weigh against extending discovery to allow Plaintiff to depose Bress. True, trial is not "imminent," a deposition of a trustee of Defendant's organization might produce "relevant evidence," and Defendant does not provide any particular reason why it would be "prejudiced" by a modest extension of discovery. Watt, 840 F. Supp. at 326. But the other facts cut strongly against Plaintiff. The parties had known since October 2025 that discovery was set to close on May 15, 2026. See ECF No. 18 at 1. And yet nothing indicates that Plaintiff pursued a deposition of Bress before discovery closed. True, she made a series of tactical and strategic choices to pursue other depositions instead as the discovery deadline approached, and for different reasons, the Court held that she was unable to take them. See generally ECF No. 23. But the timing of some of those decisions--most obviously, the decision to wait to subpoena another potential deponent until the last minute--reflects a lack of "diligen[ce]," and the result--that Plaintiff could not take another deposition without an extension of discovery--is a "foreseeab[le]" result of those decisions. Hussain, 435 F.3d at 367; Watt, 840 F. Supp. at 326. Those factors carry the day here. For these reasons, and in the Court's exercise of its "broad discretion," Strike 3, 964 F.3d at 1208, it is hereby ORDERED that the discovery shall not be extended to allow Plaintiff to depose Bress. It is further ORDERED that the parties shall appear telephonically for a post-discovery status conference on October 8, 2026, at 11:30 a.m. The parties shall contact the Courtroom Deputy at (202) 354-3495 at least one business day in advance to make arrangements to appear.Signed by Judge Timothy J. Kelly on 09/11/2026. (lctjk3)