Order | Filed: July 10, 2026
| Entered: July 10, 2026
HOLY TRINITY UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH v. COLLIER TOWNSHIP et al
Other Statutory Actions | Pennsylvania Western
Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
ORDER GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN PART 57 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendants. In the 57 Motion, Defendants seek to dismiss Holy Trinity Ukrainian Catholic Church's 1 Complaint in its entirety, arguing that (1) Holy Trinity's claims are not ripe; (2) all four counts of the Complaint should be dismissed; and (3) the claims brought against individual Defendants should be dismissed. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Holy Trinity's claims arise under federal law. As a threshold matter, Holy Trinity's claims are ripe. Defendants argue that Holy Trinity's claims are not ripe because it failed to pursue available local and state procedures for land-use appeals. ECF No. 58 at 6-10. Holy Trinity responds that, under Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 594 U.S. 474 (2021), its claims are ripe because "there [is] no question... about how the regulations at issue apply to the particular land in question." ECF No. 70 at 6-7. Defendants did not address Holy Trinity's ripeness argument in their reply. See ECF No. 73. Here, because Defendants "committed to a position" through their decisions on the Shrine proposal and the Chapel proposal, the "relatively modest" finality requirement is satisfied and "the dispute is ripe for judicial resolution." Pakdel, 594 U.S. at 478-79; see also Cath. Healthcare Int'l, Inc. v. Genoa Charter Twp., Michigan, 82 F.4th 442, 448 (6th Cir. 2023) (finding a RLUIPA claim ripe under Pakdel). Turning to the merits of the claims, the Court will deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Holy Trinity's RLUIPA substantial burden claim (Count I) and equal terms claim (Count II). Beginning with Count I, Holy Trinity has plausibly alleged that Defendants' conduct substantially burdened its religious exercise. Zubik v. City of Pittsburgh, 2025 WL 461533, at *17 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2025) (Hardy, J.) (explaining that a substantial burden in the land-use context "is something that significantly or considerably hinders, restricts, impairs, or encumbers the use (or building or conversion) of such property for the purpose of religious exercise."). For instance, the conditions imposed on Collier Township's grant of the Chapel proposal include, inter alia, a limitation that the chapel may be used for funerals and memorials only, and "no other functions or gatherings[,]" and require Holy Trinity to submit to auditing with 30-days' notice. See ECF No. 1-5. Because Holy Trinity has plausibly alleged a substantial burden on its religious exercise, particularly based on the conditions imposed on the Chapel project, and because the Court cannot conclude at this stage that Defendants' actions satisfy strict scrutiny, the Court will deny Defendants' Motion as to Count I. The Court will likewise deny Defendants' Motion as to Holy Trinity's RLUIPA equal terms claim (Count II). "[A] plaintiff asserting a claim under the RLUIPA equal terms provision must show (1) it is a religious assembly or institution, (2) subject to a land use regulation, which regulation (3) treats the religious assembly on less than equal terms with (4) a nonreligious assembly or institution (5) that causes no lesser harm to the interests the regulation seeks to advance." Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 270 (3d Cir. 2007). Holy Trinity identifies the Carpenters Complex as a secular comparator and argues that it was similarly situated as to the regulatory purpose of PEDD zones, yet Holy Trinity was subjected to differential treatment. ECF No. 80 at 9-10. The Court concludes that at this stage, Holy Trinity has sufficiently alleged an equal terms RLUIPA violation (Count II) and will therefore deny Defendants' Motion as to Count II. For similar reasons, the Court will deny Defendants' Motion as to Holy Trinity's claim under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment (Count III). Holy Trinity has plausibly alleged that it was subjected to "distinctive treatment" in comparison to the Carpenters Complex, and the Court cannot conclude at this stage that Defendants actions satisfy strict scrutiny. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993). Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants' Motion as to Count III. The Court will also deny Defendants' Motion as to Holy Trinity's Establishment Clause claim (Count IV). Defendants do not meaningfully develop any argument directed to this claim in their brief in support of their Motion. See ECF No. 58. In their... (truncated)