Order | Filed: September 22, 2026
| Entered: September 22, 2026
Pizziconi v. Gray et al
370 Other Fraud | Connecticut
Order
ORDER denying defendant Norman Gray's 468 Motion for Sanctions; Motion to treat the plaintiff as pro se. For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the defendant's motion.
On August 17, 2026, the pro se defendant Norman Gray ("Gray") filed a motion requesting that the Court, in relevant part, (i) dismiss the case with prejudice due to the plaintiff's misconduct, (ii) strike all pro se pleadings by the plaintiff, (iii) award attorney's fees to Mr. Gray, and (iv) impose Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions against the plaintiff, Ms. Pizziconi. (Doc. No. 468 at 2). Because the motion is neither captioned as one to dismiss the case nor to strike any pleadings in particular, and because the pro se defendant is not entitled to attorney's fees, those requests for relief are not addressed in this ruling. See Moreno-Cuevas v. Huntington Learning Ctr., No. 9-CV-1237(JCH), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109060, at *3 (D. Conn. November 20, 2009) ("Pro se litigants are not entitled to recover attorney's fees."). Instead, the undersigned proceeds with its consideration of the motion as one seeking the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. The defendant's request for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is not addressed because such sanctions cannot be imposed against pro se parties that are not themselves attorneys. See In re Rhee-Karn, No. 15-CV-9946(RWL), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136327, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2025) ("While § 1927 is applicable only against attorneys, the Second Circuit has held that § 1927 sanctions may be levied against pro se attorney parties.") (citing Sassower v. Field, 973 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1992)).
Although the defendant identifies various conduct by the plaintiff that he believes warrants Rule 11 sanctions, it appears the basis for his motion is his belief that the plaintiff is improperly "reaping the benefits of leniency for a 'pro se' status" despite his contention that the plaintiff has "the resource to pay for professional support." (Doc. No. 468 at 1). He further asserts that the plaintiff is "using a paralegal service in conjunction with having a lawyer as consultant on the case." (Id.). Because the defendant has failed both to identify sanctionable conduct on the plaintiff's part and to comply with the proper procedure for requesting the imposition of sanctions, the motion is denied.
There is no question that "[a] litigant in federal court has a [statutory] right to act as his or her own counsel." Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Foundation, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990). See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982) ("In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel...."). This statutory right applies with equal force to parties who have the resources to afford an attorney but choose to proceed without one. Accordingly, the plaintiff, Ms. Pizziconi, cannot be faulted or sanctioned for her decision to proceed pro se. And, as a pro se party, Ms. Pizziconi is not prevented from seeking legal assistance (as opposed to legal representation) from those willing to provide it. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 07-446 (2007) (affirming a lawyer's right to "provide legal assistance" to pro se litigants by "prepar[ing] written submissions without disclosing or ensuring the disclosure of the nature or extent of such assistance").
It is also true that pro se parties are entitled to a "liberal construction of [their pleadings]... [but] when a pro se plaintiff prepares a pleading with the help of an attorney, that pleading can no longer be entitled to liberal construction." Kimbrough v. Malloy, No. 24-CV-1572(KAD), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116216, at *2-3 (D. Conn. June 18, 2025) (declining to offer a liberal interpretation to a pro se plaintiff's complaint that was drafted with the assistance of a pro bono legal clinic). The Second Circuit has acknowledged that pleadings filed by pro se parties but "ghostwritten" by attorneys may benefit from an unwarranted liberal construction. In re Liu, 664 F.3d 367, 370-71 (2d Cir. 2011). But even still, the Second Circuit declined to impose sanctions on an attorney accused of ghostwriting pro se parties' petitions for review due to the "lack of any rule or precedent governing attorney ghostwriting." Id. at 372.
Per Ms. Pizziconi's own admissions, she has used an independent paralegal service only for the limited purpose of cite checking her pleadings. (Doc. No. 471-1 at 2). She also attests to the fact that she engaged an attorney on a limited basis through January 2026, but that the attorney only "provide[d] general feedback" and did not dra... (truncated)