Order | Filed: August 06, 2026
| Entered: August 06, 2026
Pizziconi v. Gray et al
Other Fraud | Connecticut
Order
ORDER: On July 9, 2026, the undersigned ordered monetary sanctions be awarded to the plaintiff by the defendant Norman Gray pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(a). (Doc. No. 459). The undersigned ordered the plaintiff to file an affidavit detailing her costs in drafting the 397 motion to compel and responding to the associated Court orders. (Id.). The plaintiff filed a fee affidavit on July 24, 2026, seeking $146.60 for her costs incurred in drafting the motion to compel and responding to the associated Court orders. (Doc. No. 463). Gray filed a response on August 3, 2026, asking the Court "for a compassionate ruling for no cost, based on Gray's current financial status. Any award cannot be paid and Gray will ultimately be unfairly defaulted or unfairly in contempt by default." (Doc. No. 465).
When awarding attorney's fees as a monetary sanction, "[t]he goal of a fee award 'is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.'" Rossbach v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 81 F.4th 124, 144 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011)). "A district court need not conduct an 'item-by-item' analysis of a fee application, and vague time entries or block billing may be permissible so long as the district court is able 'to conduct a meaningful review of the hours requested.'" Id. (first quoting Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam); and then quoting Restivo v. Hessemann, 846 F.3d 547, 591 (2d Cir. 2017)). A fee award for sanctions is "not bound by the lodestar amount... a court must begin 'with the lodestar or "presumptively reasonable fee," which is then adjusted as necessary to assure [the] deterrent objective is achieved.'" S.E.C. v. Smith, 798 F. Supp. 2d 412, 446 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (first citing Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 821 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1987); and then quoting Robbins & Myers, Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., No. 01CV00210(S)(F), 2010 WL 3992215, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2010)), aff'd in part, dismissed in part, 710 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2013).
The plaintiff's paralegal requests a fee of $15 or $20 per hour, which is quite low, and reports that she spent 8.5 hours on the motion to compel and supporting documents. (Doc. No. 463 at 2-3). 8.5 hours seems high for a motion to compel, but the total fee requested, $126.25, is extremely reasonable. (Id. at 2). The plaintiff also incurred $20.35 in costs for service, which is reasonable. See, e.g., Fuk Lin Pau v. Jian Le Chen, No. 3:14CV841(JBA), 2015 WL 8490907, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 10, 2015) ("Under Second Circuit precedent, awardable costs include 'those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their clients.'" (quoting LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Cir. 1998))). The Court thus orders Gray to pay to the plaintiff $146.60 in monetary sanctions on or before August 30, 2026.
This is not a recommended ruling. "A magistrate judge has authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) to impose non-dispositive sanctions." EquiGroomer, LLC v. SleekEZ, LLC, No. 3:23-CV-446 (SFR), 2025 WL 2653160, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 16, 2025). Monetary sanctions are not case-dispositive and do not "fully dispose of a claim or defense," so the undersigned can impose monetary sanctions "in the first instance." In re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litig., 673 F. Supp. 3d 352, 352-353 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (first quoting Seena Int'l v. One Step Up, Ltd., No. 15 Civ. 1095 (PKC) (BCM), 2016 WL 2865350, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2016); and then quoting Lokai Holdings LLC v. Twin Tiger USA LLC, No. 15 Civ. 9363 (ALC) (DF), 2018 WL 1512055, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2018)). Signed by Judge Robert M. Spector on 8/6/2026. (CB)