District Judge Angel Kelley: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered. This action was filed in Massachusetts Superior Court on April 29, 2026. [Dkt. 1-1]. Plaintiff Shane Mahan, through his mother, Cheri Amour Mahan, challenges the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (“BSEA”) dismissal of his complaint against Weston Public Schools for the administration of his special education services. [Dkt. 1-1]. Defendants received a summons on June 25, 2026 and timely removed to federal court on July 24, 2026. [Dkt. 1]. On July 28, 2026, Plaintiff moved to remand. [Dkt. 11]. In his Motion for Remand, Plaintiff repeatedly acknowledges that the Court has jurisdiction over his Individuals with Disability in Education Act (“IDEA”) claims. [Dkts. 11 at 7; 17 at 4 (Defendants argue “that IDEA claims may be brought in, and removed to, federal district court. Plaintiff does not contest this general proposition.”); 17 at 7 (“[T]he existence of concurrent and supplemental jurisdiction is not disputed as a general matter.”)]. Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues that removal is improper in this instance because (1) BSEA’s dismissal was on procedural grounds and (2) Plaintiff is challenging the BSEA’s actions through M.G.L. ch. 30A, Massachusetts’ mechanism for administrative review, in addition to the IDEA. [Dkt. 17 at 7].
Plaintiffs are the master of their own claims, and accordingly, “determine[ ] in the first instance what law [they] will rely upon and where [they] will bring suit.” Egan, Flanagan and Cohen, P.C. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 3d 12, 13-14 (D. Mass. 2021) (citations omitted). However, defendants in a civil lawsuit may have a statutory right of removal to federal court. Defendants may remove a civil state court case to the United States District Court for the district in which the state case was filed, so long as that federal court has “original jurisdiction” over the underlying case. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Pursuant to Section 1331, United States district courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal courts may also have supplemental jurisdiction over certain state law claims, if those claims “form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). When deciding if supplemental jurisdiction is proper, federal courts examine whether, as compared to the federal law claims, the state law claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997).
As the Supreme Court has explained, whether a given claim “arises under” federal law depends on the application of the “well-pleaded complaint” rule. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). Generally speaking, a suit “arises under the law that creates the cause of action.” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983). Whether a case arises under federal law is generally “determined from what necessarily appears on the face of a plaintiff's complaint, unaided by anything alleged in the anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., L.L.C., 35 F.4th 44, 51 (1st Cir. 2022) (citations omitted).
Here, not only has Plaintiff admitted that the Court has jurisdiction over his IDEA claims, but also, the federal question is apparent from the face of his complaint. Plaintiff did not state specific causes of action in his complaint. However, the Complaint states that the state court had “jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) and M.G.L. c. 30A, §14.” [Dkt. 1-1]. Section 1415(i)(2)(A) is a provision of the IDEA that permits certain individuals to bring civil actions to appeal the results of a due process hearing under the IDEA. Plaintiff invokes section 1415(i)(2)(A) because he is challenging the BSEA’s handling of his request for a hearing under the IDEA. As such, a federal question is apparent from the face of his complaint. This holds true even though Plaintiff is appealing a purely procedural decision by the BSEA. L.P. v. Longmeadow Pub. Schs., No. 10-CV-40190, 2012 WL 3542581, at *11-13 (D. Mass. Feb. 24, 2012) (addressing a BSEA decision regarding statute of limitations).
Both Plaintiff’s M.G.L. ch. 30A and IDEA claims arise from the same BSEA hearing request and decision; therefore, the state and federal questions “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 165. As such, supplemental jurisdiction is also appropriate in this action. For the foregoing reasons, Plain... (truncated)