Order | Filed: August 03, 2026
| Entered: August 03, 2026
PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 719 PENSION TRUST FUND v. DICKS SPORTING GOODS, INC. et al
Securities/Commodities | Pennsylvania Western
Order
ORDER: The Court has considered the parties' competing proposals in light of the Third Circuit's recent jurisprudence governing class certification and Judge Hornak's thoughtful discussion of those principles in Howard v. Arconic Inc., No. 2:17-cv-1057 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2022) (ECF No. 183). As Judge Hornak observed, the Third Circuit's recent decisions require district courts to conduct a rigorous analysis of Rule 23's requirements, an inquiry that often necessitates the development of a factual record that substantially overlaps with the merits of the underlying claims.
This Court agrees with Judge Hornak's analysis. Although Rule 23 requires the parties to develop a robust factual record sufficient to permit the Court to determine whether the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been established, that obligation does not lend itself to a rigid separation between "class-certification" and "merits" discovery. As Judge Hornak recognized, any sharp line of demarcation between the two either no longer exists or is, at best, indistinct.
Accordingly, the Court will not bifurcate discovery into separate class-certification and merits phases. Instead, the Court will establish a single period of fact discovery. The parties are expected to prioritize discovery bearing on Rule 23 issues so that the class-certification question may be presented and resolved at an early practicable time. Discovery that cannot reasonably be shown to relate to the proving or disproving of a Rule 23 requirement ordinarily should be deferred until after the class-certification issues have been submitted to the Court. In the event of a dispute regarding whether particular discovery is premature, the Court will employ the burden-shifting approach articulated by Judge Hornak in Howard.
The Court also notes its disappointment with the parties' Rule 26(f) Report. Having reviewed the Report in its entirety, the Court observed that the parties reached agreement on remarkably few matters, including issues that should have lent themselves to reasonable compromise. For example, the parties could not agree whether Defendants' expert reports should be due on February 9, 2027, or six days later, on February 15, 2027. Nor could they agree whether Defendants' memorandum in opposition to class certification should be due on February 9, 2027, or February 15, 2027. These are the types of scheduling matters that ordinarily should be resolved through good-faith negotiation rather than presented to the Court for resolution.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) contemplates that counsel will confer in good faith to develop a proposed discovery plan. Likewise, Rule 1 charges both the Court and the parties with securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. The Court expects counsel to make meaningful efforts to reach reasonable compromises before seeking judicial intervention. Going forward, the parties shall approach scheduling and discovery issues with those obligations firmly in mind. The Court will not hesitate to resolve disputes that genuinely require judicial intervention, but it expects counsel to narrow those disputes to matters of substance rather than matters that should have been resolved through professional cooperation. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kezia O. L. Taylor on 08/03/2026. Text-only entry; no PDF document will issue. This text-only entry constitutes the Order of the Court or Notice on the matter. (jmb)