Order | Filed: August 06, 2026
| Entered: August 06, 2026
Errato v. Lewis
Real Property: Other | Connecticut
Order on Motion for Extension of Time Order on Motion to Dismiss/Lack of Jurisdiction Order on Motion to Stay Order on Motion to Strike
ORDER granting 22 Motion to Dismiss. Mr. Errato purports to bring suit against Mr. Lewis (a citizen of South Carolina) and the attorney Mr. Lewis retained to represent his interests in a property dispute in that state, where the subject property also is located. Mr. Errato contends that a lis pendens filed (again, in South Carolina) by Defendants against the subject property was wrongful and that he has suffered financial injury as a result.
These few background facts immediately conjure questions of venue, as it is not clear why Mr. Errato would bring an action here to adjudicate what clearly is a foreign dispute. The answer to that question, though, is the reason this case must be dismissed: Mr. Errato already has challenged the lis pendens in South Carolina courts (and Connecticut courts, too, it appears) without success, and now he seeks a different result in a different jurisdiction.
The court finds this gambit to constitute inappropriate forum shopping, which may be grounds enough to dismiss the complaint. But more importantly, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any of the claims. In the first instance, Mr. Errato does not himself own the property at issue. The parcel actually is owned by an S-corporation, and though Mr. Errato is the sole shareholder of that S-corporation, that does not confer upon him standing to sue with respect to the corporation's property. Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 46162 (2004) ("It is commonly understood that '[a] shareholdereven the sole shareholderdoes not have standing to assert claims alleging wrongs to the corporation.'") (quoting Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 836 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); see also Sanchez v. Blustein, Shapiro, Rich & Barone LLP, No. 13-CV-8886 CS, 2014 WL 7339193, at *6 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014) (While an S corporation is treated differently for taxation purposes, it remains a corporation in all other ways, and it and its shareholders are separate entities who generally do not have standing to sue on the corporation's behalf.) (quoting In re AFY, 734 F.3d 810, 820 (8th Cir.2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). And even if Mr. Errato were to amend the complaint such that it named the corporation as the plaintiff, Mr. Errato cannot represent the corporation, and would have to secure counsel.
Further still, even if Mr. Errato were to amend the complaint and secure counsel, it remains that the actions which are the basis of his claims (Defendants' filing of a lis pendens and asserting claims for a constructive trust and injunction) all are absolutely privileged both in South Carolina and in Connecticut (as it not clear under which state's laws Mr. Errato sues). In Connecticut, "[i]t is well settled that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged [as] long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy." Chamerda v. Opie, 185 Conn. App. 627, 642 (2018) (quoting Bruno v. Travelers Companies, 172 Conn. App. 717, 727 (2017)). This is true even where the statements made are fraudulent. Id. at 641. The same is true in South Carolina. Pond Place Partners, Inc. v. Poole, 351 S.C. 1, 23 (Ct. App. 2002) ("South Carolina has long recognized that relevant pleadings, even if defamatory, are absolutely privileged."). And this also is true of a lis pendens, as well. Id. at 32. ("We find the filing of a lis pendens is ABSOLUTELY privileged in South Carolina.") (emphasis in original); Chamerda, 185 Conn. App. at 643 (stating that the filing of a lis pendens is "immune in part due to statutory imprimatur" and because it necessarily relates to a specific lawsuit). Connecticut in particular recognizes that immunity strips the court of subject matter jurisdiction, see Bruno, 172 Conn. App. at 719 ("[W]e conclude that the litigation privilege provides an absolute immunity from suit and, thus, implicates the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction."), such that "the doctrine of absolute immunity 'protects against suit as well as liabilityin effect, against having to litigate at all.'" Id. at 719 n.4 (quoting Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 272 Conn. 776, 786 (2005)) (emphasis in original).
Accordingly, this action is dismissed with prejudice. All pending motions are denied as moot. The Clerk of Court is asked to please close this case. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Omar A. Williams on 8/6/26. (RW)