Motion | Filed: August 03, 2026
| Entered: August 03, 2026
Urbanstrong LLC v. Turner et al
Racketeer/Corrupt Organization | New York Eastern
Temporary Restraining Order
MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order , Expedited Discovery and Other Relief by Urbanstrong LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Motion, # 2 Declaration of Benjamin Folkinshteyn, Esq., # 3 Declaration of Alan Burchell, # 4 Exhibit A (Agreement), # 5 Exhibit B (e-mail), # 6 Exhibit C (Form w-9), # 7 Exhibit D (e-mail), # 8 Exhibit E (e-mail), # 9 Exhibit F (e-mail), # 10 Proposed Order) (Folkinshteyn, Benjamin)
Order | Filed: August 03, 2026
| Entered: August 03, 2026
Bhogal v. Tingo International Holdings Inc. et al
Labor: Other | Connecticut
Order on Motion to Dismiss Order on Motion for Prejudgment Remedy
ORDER granting 36 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 45 Motion for Prejudgment Remedy. The court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case. Stated briefly, Plaintiff entered into an employment agreement and has not been paid. Default judgment already has entered as to the corporate defendants in this matter. The lone remaining defendant, Dozy Mmobuosi, has moved to dismiss all claims against him for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court agrees with Defendant Mmobuosi.
A two-part inquiry is used to determine whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a particular party. First, the relevant long-arm statute must be satisfied, and second, exercising personal jurisdiction must comport with the principals of due process. Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1999). It is Plaintiffs burden to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 1996). Where the issue arises very early in litigation, before discovery and without an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdiction through its own affidavits and supporting materials. Bank Brussels, 171 F.3d at 784 (quoting Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir.1981)).
Plaintiff fails at the first step. Relevant here, Connecticut's long-arm statute provides that "a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual... who in person or through an agent: (1) Transacts any business within the state; (2) commits a tortious act within the state... " or "(3) commits a tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within the state..., if such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce...." Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-59b(a). It is undisputed that Defendant Mmobuosi, individually, does not satisfy any of these preconditions. Plaintiff contends, though, that personal jurisdiction can be exercised through the corporate defendants by piercing the corporate veil.
The court disagrees. Connecticut law recognizes that in "exceptional circumstances," the usual rule, "which recognizes the individuality of corporate entities and the independent character of each in respect to their corporate transactions, and the obligations incurred by each in the course of such transactions, will be disregarded, where... the interests of justice and righteous dealing so demand...."). Hersey v. Lonrho, Inc., 73 Conn. App. 78, 86 (2002) (quoting Davenport v. Quinn, 53 Conn.App. 282, 399-300 (1999)). Either of two tests may be applied to determine whether it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil in a particular case: the instrumentality test or the identity test. Id. The former requires a showing of three elements: (1) complete domination of finances, policy, and business practice such that the relevant corporate entity has "no separate mind, will or existence of its own;" (2) use of this total control to commit some wrong in contravention of a plaintiff's legal rights; and (3) proximate cause. Id. The latter requires a plaintiff to show that there existed "such a unity of interest and ownership" between defendants that they could not be independent of each other. Id. Plaintiff relies upon two facts to support its bid to pierce the corporate veil. First, he alleges that Defendant Mmobuosi's personal residence in the United Kingdom was leased by and paid for by his corporation. And second, he alleges that the corporation paid a judgment for unpaid rent at that residence. But even accepting these facts as true, they are insufficient to satisfy either test. Both tests require allegations sufficient to show that two entities act as one, such as a "lack of formalities observed, the failure to completely document various transactions, the free use by the entities and [an individual] to make... loans and pay various debts, and the payments to himself of large salaries after the claim arose...." Davenport 53 Conn. App. at 301; see also Toshiba Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Mobile Med. Sys., Inc., 53 Conn. App. 484, 490 (1999) (piercing the corporate veil where the defendant company held no corporate meetings, did not f... (truncated)