Law360 (July 27, 2026, 7:01 PM EDT) -- The Fourth Circuit held Monday that the Sixth Amendment rights of a South Carolina man were violated when a judge denied him the ability to represent himself during sentencing because he did not make the request prior to the start of his drug-trafficking trial.

The three-judge panel said in a published opinion that Kenyada Jaqu should be resentenced after he was barred from firing his attorney and representing himself at his initial sentencing because a federal district court incorrectly held the request was untimely.

"We thus conclude that a request for self-representation at sentencing made after trial but before sentencing is not subject to the discretion of the district court if the criteria for self-representation are otherwise met," U.S. Circuit Judge Paul V. Niemeyer said in the opinion. "In reaching this conclusion, we rely on the practical reality that there is, typically, a substantial period of time between the jury's verdict and the sentencing hearing, such that the district court could readily address the request without prejudicing the timing of sentencing."

Jaqu was convicted of drug trafficking and firearm offenses in October 2020. While awaiting sentencing, he fired his court-appointed attorney. Five months after the verdict, but before sentencing had been scheduled, Jaqu informed the court he wanted to represent himself, the opinion said.

The court held a meeting with Jaqu and his attorney and the judge strongly cautioned Jaqu against firing his attorney, pointing out the potential risks of self-representation. Jaqu continued to seek self-representation, but the district court denied his request in an April 2021 order, the opinion said.

The district court acknowledged in its order that Jaqu had the right to represent himself, but found that his request was "thoroughly untimely," because it was made after the trial began. Jaqu appealed, telling the Fourth Circuit that under the 1975 U.S. Supreme Court case Faretta v. California, the denial violated his Sixth Amendment rights.

The panel found that under Faretta a district court is required to hold a hearing to ensure a request for self-representation is unequivocal, voluntary and timely. The opinion noted that the timeliness component means a defendant must make an effort to avoid delays that might be incurred as a result of the request.

The district court failed to explain what constituted a "thoroughly untimely" delay, or how the case would be negatively affected if it granted the motion, the panel said, adding that a Faretta hearing should have been held to determine whether the request created an undue delay for sentencing.

The opinion said that because Jaqu's request came after trial, and before a sentencing date had even been set, his request avoided any untimely delays. The request could not be seen as a delay tactic by Jaqu and afforded prosecutors ample time to prepare, the panel said.

Jaqu also claimed that he was incorrectly sentenced under an armed career criminal classification and that the enhancement should be removed. The panel said that because it was ordering resentencing anyway, it would not rule on the enhancement component of his appeal.

An attorney representing Jaqu and a spokesperson for the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of South Carolina did not respond to requests for comment.

U.S. Circuit Judges Paul V. Niemeyer, James Andrew Wynn and Barbara Milano Keenan sat on the panel for the Fourth Circuit.

The government is represented by Thomas Ernest Booth, Nicole M. Argentieri and Lisa H. Miller of the U.S. Department of Justice and Adair F. Boroughs and Kathleen M. Stoughton of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of South Carolina.

Jaqu is represented by Jonathan McKey Milling of Milling Law Firm LLC.

The case is USA v. Kenyada Jaqu, case number 21-4677, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

--Editing by Linda Voorhis.

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