Order | Filed: June 25, 2026
| Entered: June 25, 2026
Coleman v. Herb Chambers BMW
Consumer Credit | Massachusetts
Order on Motion for Reconsideration
Judge Mark G. Mastroianni: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered denying 61 Motion for Reconsideration. As the parties acknowledge, "a court should grant a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order only when the movant demonstrates (1) an intervening change in the law; (2) the discovery of new evidence not previously available; or (3) a clear error of law in the first order." Davis v. Lehane, 89 F. Supp. 2d 142, 147 (D. Mass. 2000); see also Monsarrat v. Zaiger, 303 F. Supp. 3d 164, 166 (D. Mass. 2018). Moreover, the Supreme Court "has admonished that 'courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.'" Davis, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)). Defendant has not demonstrated that reconsideration is necessary or appropriate here. Defendant argues the court "erred in finding that the Credit Authorization... was either 'valid for 60 days'... and/or that the Dealership was barred from relying on the Credit Authorization because it was limited to a cancelled lease transaction or based on its purported assurances to Coleman that no further credit inquiries would be needed if she ordered her vehicle by June 28, 2022." (Dkt. No. 62 at 5.) But the court made no such definitive finding. Instead, the court concluded, at the summary judgment stage, "that Plaintiff has raised a jury question as to whether her initial credit inquiry authorization was revoked or limited to a cancelled lease transaction, such that Defendant lacked a valid written authorization for the August 17, 2022 credit inquiry." (Dkt. No. 59.) As Plaintiff argues, the credit Approval Notification is ambiguous as to how long Plaintiff's written consent lasted, and the Approval Notification language suggests the consent was limited to a lease transaction. Given this ambiguity, along with the explicit oral and written assurances that no further credit inquiries would be made under these circumstances, the court concluded a jury would have to resolve this factual dispute. Defendant next argues the court erred in concluding Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of emotional distress damages to survive summary judgment. The court is not persuaded. First, Defendant essentially rehashes the same argument made at summary judgment, which is "not enough to merit reconsideration." Davis, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 148; see also Ordonez-Santay v. Lynch, 691 F. App'x 645, 647 (1st Cir. 2016) ("When, as here, a movant simply rehashes contentions previously made and rejected, he has no legal basis to insist upon reconsideration."); Courtemanche v. Motorola Sols., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 3d 279, 284 (D. Mass. 2025) ("A motion for reconsideration is not an occasion for parties to rehash arguments previously rejected.... Mere disagreement with the reasoning or outcome of a judicial decision does not warrant reconsideration." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Second, the court is not convinced it made a clear error of law in concluding Plaintiff's deposition testimony provided sufficient evidence of emotional distress damages. As the court explained, "[h]umiliation and embarrassment are cognizable injuries under the FCRA; and there is no requirement that a plaintiff provide corroborating evidence or medical testimony to support an award of damages." (Dkt. No. 59 (quoting Dixon-Rollins v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 753 F. Supp. 2d 452, 461 (E.D. Pa. 2010).) Rather, "[s]uch corroboration goes only to the weight of evidence of injury, not the existence of it." Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 720 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Azimi v. Jordan's Meats, Inc., 456 F.3d 228, 23637 (1st Cir. 2006); Aponte-Rivera v. DHL Sols. (USA), Inc., 650 F.3d 803, 81112 (1st Cir. 2011). Moreover, at the summary judgment stage, the court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence," because "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Accordingly, "[i]f a jury accepts testimony of a plaintiff that establishes an injury without corroboration, the plaintiff should be allowed to recover under the FCRA," Cortez, 617 F.3d at 720, and the lack of corroboration or detail here does not require summary judgment in favor of Defendant. See Azimi, 456 F.3d at 236 ("'Translating legal damage into money damages -- especially in cases which involve few significant items of measurable economic loss -- is a matter peculiarly within a jury's ken'" (quoting ... (truncated)